Dividend Policy and Taxation—A Review by Das, Pradip Kumar
                                  Journal of Research in Business, Economics and Management (JRBEM)                                                                                                                                                                      
ISSN: 2395-2210  
Volume 14, Issue 3 available at www.scitecresearch.com/journals/index.php/jrbem                                             2703| 
 
 
SCITECH                                                                              Volume 14, Issue 3 
RESEARCH ORGANISATION                                                June 17, 2020 
     Journal of  Research in Business, Economics and Management                                          
www.scitecresearch.com 
 
 
Dividend Policy and Taxation—A Review 
 
Dr. Pradip Kumar Das 
Associate Professor 
Commerce Unit (Morning), J.K. College, Purulia 
Affiliation under S.K.B. University, Purulia 
Mailing Address: Cooks’ Compound, 
Post.& Dist. Purulia(W.B.), India; Pin Code: 723102 
Email Id: pradip57.prl@rediffmail.com 
 
 
 ABSTRACT  
Indeed, corporate dividend policy and taxation is a subject of intense research. Mostly, statutory amendments in the  
dividend tax practice fabricate the dividend payout policy of corporate sector. At times, corporate composing substantial 
promoters’ securities are identified to keep a major objective to curtail their  dividend payout. The study aims at 
analyzing the interaction between dividend policy and taxation. This paper provides a brief contribution of the diverse 
thoughts on the clientele effect for analyzing the impact of taxation on corporate dividend policy and finds that the 
temporal pattern of corporate dividend payout and dynamic dividend behavior have significant impact on taxation in 
variety of modalities. The findings have significant implication for companies, investors and the Government. 
Keywords: Dividend; taxation; clientele effect; Corporate dividend policy; shareholders. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
Tax burden on dividend depends on corporate and personal income-tax systems. In classical system, total tax is the sum 
of corporation tax, capital gains tax and tax on dividend. In imputation system, total tax is corporation tax plus effective 
gains tax plus reduced dividend tax. Impact of taxation on dividend policy plays significant role to both academicians 
and practitioners. From academic perspective, pertinence of taxation highlights the scope to which corporate contemplate 
after tax return of their shareholders and how any tax amendments affect dividend payout. On the other hand, 
practitioners intend to  cognize how taxation influences dividends. Further, impact of dividend taxation is important to 
fund managers and users as changes in tax codes impress net return and corresponding pricing of shares. Most countries 
over the world accept different systems of taxing dividends. Countries following classical system dissociate 
shareholders’ income from their corporate income. This system tolerates double taxation: first at the corporate level and 
then at the personal level. Conversely, countries supporting integrated system normally have full or partial relief from 
dividend tax in contemplation of the fact that the same unit of earning is taxed at the corporate level.  
2. BACKGROUND 
In theory, taxation prevents corporate from paying dividends; but Brav et al., (2005) in his empirical study remarked that 
taxation plays minor role in dividend decision. Therefore, the question remains why corporate still pay dividend despite 
their heavy tax burden? Michealy, Thaley and Womack (1995) in their studies indicated that although dividend has tax 
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disadvantage, shareholders react positively with increase in dividend and negatively with decrease in dividend. Tax 
disadvantage of dividend and yet their popularity argues the conventional approach of dividend payout policy. Black. F 
(1976) highlighted the shortcomings of the finance theory in reacting the question, why corporate subject to classical tax 
system pay dividend? Models based on information asymmetry recommend that dividend changes provide information 
about the corporate future cash flows or about their cost of capital and/or maturity phase. Agency theory suggests that 
dividend provides constructive device to curtail agency cost. Behavioral finance theory propounds that dividend partly 
accommodates certain inclination in individuals like market sentiment, etc. The paper is a modest attempt to analyze the 
dividend tax systems of different studies but finds that no methodical and consistent policy  is pursued, rather, mixed 
result is reflected. 
 
3. GOAL OF THE STUDY 
 
Goal of the study is to make a synthesized study on the influence of the taxation of investors on the behavior of 
distribution. This paper briefly reviews some aspects of taxation of dividends of corporate. Despite few theoretical and 
empirical results found in various articles and books, this document is not a comprehensive study; the purpose is rather to 
highlight certain issues glimpsed climacteric about taxation and dividend.  
 
4. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Dividend policy issue is a controversial subject. Modigliani and Miller (1961) observed that in a perfect market and 
particularly in the absence of differences in taxation of dividends and capital gains, shareholders’ wealth is independent 
from dividend policy. Black (1976) noted that dividend policy continues to be confusing in the task of development of 
corporate. Miller and Modigliani (1961) demonstrated that contrasting taxation of dividends and capital gains forms one 
of the main imperfections of capital markets. Moreover, in most countries dividends are taxed more extremely than 
capital gains. Many researchers have advanced studies on both the effects of taxation on payout policy and the clientele 
effect. Farrar and Selwyn (1967) and Brennan (1970) concluded that if the tax rate on dividend is higher than capital 
gains, optimum distribution policy presents no dividend. Repurchasing share implicitly suggests to pay the excess flow of 
the company. Several studies like Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979), Booth and Johnston (1984), Michaely and Vila 
(1996) and Sander (2007) supported the argument of tax effect. Others like Black and Scholes (1974), Miller and Scholes 
(1982) objected and proposed different explanations. Elton and Gruber (1970) tested the hypothesis of Miller and 
Modigliani to the existence of clientele effect on the American market. They compared the value of the corporate before 
and after payment of dividend. They substantiated an arbitrary model of investors around the payment date and found 
statistically significant positive relationship between the dividend yield and lower stock prices on ex-dividend. Their 
results are consistent with clientele hypothesis. Pettit (1977) showed that clientele is worth and there is no reason to 
remodel dividend policy for each corporate. Any remodeling of the policy, has, rather, unacceptable transaction cost for 
investors. Prevalent distinct empirical literatures on the subject of taxation and its impression on dividend policy brings 
forth mixed results. Hence, further studies govern to pursue other areas of divided policy.  
 
5. METHODOLOGY & LIMITATION 
 
The study is descriptive in nature. Descriptive research has been preferred for developing a better profundity of 
knowledge. Data required for the study has been collected from secondary sources viz. literature reviews, empirical 
studies,  website, books, journals, reports, etc. The inherent limitation of the study is that as the study is based on 
published data and information, and this secondary source may be lacking in authenticity, the result inferred there from 
may not be completely dependable. The corpus of this paper is, therefore, limited to establish, in the first place, a global 
sketch on the reciprocity between dividend policy and taxation. On the other hand, it unveils the main strategy espoused 
during the analysis of this reciprocity. In the second place, an assessment on the foremost mission maneuvering the 
concept of the clientele effect has been represented. 
 6. RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
 
6.1. Key factors influencing dividend policy 
There are several key factors influencing corporate's dividend policy. The common factors are: 
 Income stability: Popular companies having stable, ineludible income streams are more likely to pay dividend than 
companies having growing or volatile income. New and rapidly growing companies rarely pay dividends as they 
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prefer to invest their profits back into the company to feed more future growth. Companies with irresolute revenue 
streams often prefer not to pay dividend, or pay small dividend to make sure the sustainability payout. 
 Better return: Another influencing factor on management's dividend policy is the possibility for better return 
through capital reinvestment. A company even though its revenues are stable and predictable prefers not to pay  if it 
feels in the interest of its shareholders to use their profits for other business activities than paying dividend.  
 Tax consideration: Dividends are effectively taxed twice-once at the corporate level, and again when they are paid 
out to shareholders. Many corporate and their investors feel that repurchasing of shares are better for returning 
capital. However, this permits investors to reinvest their dividend without worrying about dividend taxes. 
 Legal requirements: It is note worthy that few corporate having no alternative choice pay dividend. On the other 
hand, few require approval before paying dividend. Since the financial crisis, many banks need to submit capital 
plans for statutory confirmation for any plan to foster their payouts. 
 Economic condition: Market environment influences dividend policy. If certain sectors having trouble anticipate 
downward profits, it is natural for them to protect their dividend. 
 
6.2. Theories: dividend and taxation  
 
6.2.1. Irrelevance of dividend policy without taxes  
 
Modigliani and Miller (1961) demonstrated no impact of dividend policy on share value and, thus, shareholders’ wealth 
in a perfect financial market and particularly in the absence of differences in taxation of dividends and capital gains. 
Shareholders should be passable between receiving dividend or capital gain. Modigliani and Miller (1961) devised a 
model in a perfect capital market environment under particular assumptions:  
• No tax or tax deformation  between the taxation of dividends and capital gains;  
• Free information and equally approachable to all;  
• Absence of transaction costs and issue costs;  
• Rational investors. 
With these assumptions, price of a share at the beginning of a period is defined as equal to the current value of the 
dividend paid at the end of the period increasing the price on the market at the end. This can be expressed as follows:  
P0=1÷1+r (D1+P1 ) …………………..(1)
 
Where:  
P0 : Price of a share;  
r : Rate of return;  
D1 : Dividend expected;  
P1 : Price of share at the end of the period.  
Assuming ‘n’ is the number of shares at the beginning of the period studied and ‘m’ is the number of new shares sold at 
the end.  
Equation (1) can be rewritten thus:  
𝑛𝑃0=1÷1+r{nD1+ (n + m) P1−mP1} … (2)  
Equation (2) denotes that the total value of the old shares is equal to the value of the dividend which is paid to them plus 
value of the old and new shares minus the value of the new shares. So for a program of investment and a financing 
strategy, amount of capital increase is equal in:  
𝑚𝑃1=𝐼₋ (𝐵−𝑛𝐷1)………………………. (3)   
Where:  
I: Investment;  
B: Benefits created during the period;  
By replacing the amount of capital increase (mP1) by its expression, the following is obtained:  
𝑛𝑃0=1÷1+r { (n+m) P1−I+B}…………… (4)  
Since D does not materialize directly in the expression and other parameters are assumed to be independent of the value 
of dividend, current share value is independent of dividend policy. Analysis of Modigliani and Miller is valid in a perfect 
world. It ignores tax and transaction costs surrounding financial transactions. Indeed, in a world without taxes, or at least 
where taxation is rigorously neutral in the world of realization of the income, it will be indifferent to each individual 
shareholder.  
 
6.2.2. Dividend policy in a world with taxes  
 
The study of Modigliani and Miller functioned in a corporate world without taxes or at least neutral with the realization 
of income. Usually, dividends are taxed as capital gains especially for people belonging to maximum tax rate. Investors 
take tax considerations in their choice. Farrar and Selwyn (1967) proved that corporate ignore paying dividends if 
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dividends are more heavily taxed than capital gains. Albouy & Dumontier(1992)observed that corporate fulfill the needs 
for liquidity of the  shareholders by using other alternates for dividend like issue of bonus shares, share repurchase, etc. 
Brennan (1970) also espoused the similar explanation of Farrar and Selwyn. Subject to a particular degree of risk, a 
moderate dividend distribution yields much higher expected return than the tax difference between dividends and capital 
gains. Thus, Brennan instituted that favorable tax treatment of capital gains over dividends normally governs less 
assessment. Litzenberger and Ramasway (1979) outline linear relationship between the increase in the rate of return to 
equity and dividend yield if tax on capital gain becomes less than dividend. They established that shareholders 
necessitate increase in pre-tax return to compensate the outcome of taxation. However, Black and Scholes 
(1974)exercised a different methodology and discerned no association between the rate of return on equity and dividend 
yield. This result is in accord with  the  result of Miller and Scholes (1982). Miller and Scholes justified the findings of 
Litzenberger and Ramaswamy. They watched that investors can avoid taxes on dividends by borrowing and investing at 
the same rate on assets exempted from tax. Few studies like Poterba(2004) reviewed the responses of corporate for 
amendments in taxation and eyed no association between proposition and dividend taxation. However, empirical studies 
of Lee, Liu, Richard, & Subrahmanyam(2006) suggested a relationship between taxes and dividend policy. Brav, 
Graham, Harvey & Michealy (2005) propounded that taxation of dividend is not a prime consideration in the decisions of 
payment of dividends and the selection between dividends and repurchases. Elton and Gruber (1970) demonstrated that 
investors have no preference for dividends, on the contrary, taxation steers at  preferring capital gains. Michaely and Vila 
(1996),  McDonald (2001) and Sander (2007) further strengthened this idea. 
6.3. Dividend clientele effect  
 
Investors’ behavior are not always same in the face of financial investments due to fiscal and personal considerations. 
Few prefer the securities contributing periodic income while others prefer capital gains. Usually, investors having low tax 
support high dividend shares while investors belonging to high tax category eulogize low dividend shares and high 
capital gains. Thus, clientele effect alludes the shareholders to search for a corporate that suits their financial budget. 
Consequently, corporate accepts a dividend policy that can meet their shareholders’ requirements. In general, dividends 
are taxed more than capital gains. In the opinion of Modigliani and Miller (1961), clientele effect of dividend is one of 
the important drawbacks of capital market. Different taxations enable a corporate to fascinate clientele of investors. 
There is no consensus of opinion about clientele effect of dividend and taxation. Few studies provide theoretical and 
empirical evidences to clientele effect while others provide contradictory evidences. Kent Baker (2009) surmised that 
researchers pertain two models to examine the clientele effect - Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and the model 
preferring transactions on the day of dividend payment. For understanding delineation of the results of these models, a 
distinction between the two models may be prospered: static clientele model and dynamic clientele model. 
6.3.1. Static Clientele Model  
 
Pettit (1977) demonstrated positive relationship between age of investors and dividend yield of their portfolios. From 
other perspective, it reveals negative relationship between investors’ income and dividend yield. Pettit also substantiated 
that investors having high systematic risk portfolios choose high dividend shares. Investors are not taxed in the same way 
Albouy & Dumontier(1992) ascertained that it is from the rate of return that the companies fascinate a particular tax. 
Elton and Gruber (1970) deliberated that the investors having high tax rate on high dividend selects companies with low 
dividend, while the investors having low tax rate prefer liberal corporate about payment of dividend. Allen and Michaely 
(2003) noted propensity of investors to retain shares with low dividend. Seida (2001) marked the appearance of clients on 
dividend taxation. Hence, it can be reckoned that many studies have instituted substantiation confirming the hypothesis 
of clientele effect; while other studies have proven irregularity in the hypothesis.  
6.3.2. Dynamic Clientele Model  
 
Kalay,A.(1982) stipulated that based on the dynamic version of clientele effect, investors, in non-appearance of 
transaction costs, utilize the liberty  to interact the actions during detachment of dividend to enable the least taxed 
investors to presume dividend. Berk & DeMarzo (2014) opined that shareholders benefitted from additional tax on low 
dividend retain the shares in the time of detachment instead of retaining all the time. Consequently, investors who are 
taxed heavily can sell their shares  to insignificant tax inflicted investors. Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986) noticed 
significant growth in transaction volume on the day of detachment of the coupon. Studies of Liljeblom et al. (2001), 
Seida, (2001), McDonald 2001 and Sander (2007)analyzed the market reactions around dividend events and confirmed 
the existence of the clientele effect. However, the studies made by Bali and Hite(1998),Lewellen et al.(1978),Lakonishok 
and Vermaelen (1986) do not support the hypothesis of clientele effect. Jain (2007) showed that institutional investors 
prefer corporate paying low dividend or no dividend at all. Brav et al. (2005) showed that  institutional investors have 
dispassionate object about dividend decisions. Desai and Jin (2011) revealed inclination of the maximum institutional 
investors towards dividend taxation. Grinstein and Michaely (2005) watched that institutional investors guard funding in 
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corporate that do not allot dividend but still favor corporate paying higher dividends. Michaely, Thaler and Womack 
(1995) found that portfolios of institutional investors remain unimpressed due to dividend changes. Thus, various 
empirical studies substantiate clientele effect or otherwise of dividend policy and taxation(Table-1). 
Table- 1: Empirical results of few studies on the clientele effect 
AUTHOR(S) SAMPLE/ COUNTRY PERIODICITY EMPIRICAL 
RESULTS 
Miller and Modigliani(1961) (USA) 1961 Clientele effect 
 
Elton and Gruber (1970) 4148 observations (USA) 1966-1967 Clientele effect 
 
Black and Scholes (1974) 25 common shares listed on 
NYSE(USA) 
1931-1966 Clientele effect 
 
Petit (1977) Portfoliopositions914Individualinve
stors(USA) 
1957-1967 Clientele effect 
 
Lewellen and et al (1978) 2500 individual investors (USA) 1964-1970 No clientele effect 
 
Litzenberger and Ramaswany  
(1979) 
(USA) 1936-1977 Clientele effect 
 
Kalay (1982) 2540 observations (USA) 1966-1967 No clientele effect 
 
Booth and Johnston (1984) Companies listed in Toronto Stock 
Exchange (Canada) 
1970-1980 Clientele effect 
 
Poterba &Summers (1984) British companies (UK) 1955-1981 Clientele effect 
 
Lakonishok and Vermaelen 
(1986) 
(Canada) 1970-1981 No clientele effect 
 
Desbrières (1988) (France) 1977-1990 Clientele effect 
 
Scholz (1992) (USA) 1983 Clientele effect 
Hamon & Jacquillat, (1992) (France) 1977-1990 Clientele effect 
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Bali & Hite (1998) 207,499observations (USA) 1962-1994 No clientele effect 
Morgan & Thomas (1998) British companies (UK) 1975-1993 No clientele effect 
 
Liljeblom and et  al(2001) (Finland) 1994-1996 Clientele effect 
 
McDonald (2001) Companies listed in Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange(Germany) 
 
1989-1998 Clientele effect 
 
Barclay and al (2003) 336 companies (USA) 1995 No clientele effect 
 
Anand(2004) 500 companies (India) 1999-2000 Clientele effect 
 
Grinstein & Michaely (2005) 79,010 observations (USA) 1980-1996 No clientele effect 
 
Graham and  Kumar(2006) (USA) 1991-1996 Clientele effect 
 
Lee, Liu and Roll (2006) Companies listed on the Taiwan 
Stock Exchange(Taiwan) 
 
1995-1999 Clientele effect 
 
Jain (2007) Companies of NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ (USA) 
1989-1996 No clientele effect 
 
Sander (2007) Companies listed in Tallinn Stock 
Exchange(Estonia) 
2000-2006 
 
Clientele effect 
 
Procianoy&Verdi (2009) 394 observations (Brazil) 1996 - 2000 No clientele effect 
 
Desai & Li Jin (2010) (USA) 1980-1997 Clientele effect 
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Oubal(2013) (Morocco) 2013 No clientele effect 
 
Dahlquist and et al (2014) Companies listed in Stockholm 
Stock Exchange(Sweden) 
 
2001-2005 Clientele effect 
 
Muñoz & Rodriguez (2016) Companies listed on the Stock 
Exchange of Santiago (Chile) 
1999-2012 Clientele effect 
 
N.B.: Author’s own elaboration 
Table-1 exhibits that maximum studies have clientele effects(shown in yellow color) 
7. DIVIDEND POLICY—INDIAN CONTEXT 
Corporate in India declaring dividend pay dividend tax in addition to tax levied on their income. Dividend received by 
the shareholders from Indian corporate enjoys exemption from tax as the corporate declaring such dividend already 
deducts dividend distribution tax (DDT) before making payment. However as introduced by the Finance Act, 2016, a 
resident individual/HUF/Firm is chargeable to tax @ 10%, if the aggregate amount of dividend received from an Indian 
corporate during the financial year exceeds Rs 10,00,000 (Section 115BBDA). Dividend received from foreign corporate 
is subsumed  in the total income of taxpayer and is imposed tax at the prescribed rate. Such dividend features taxed in 
India as well as in the country in which the foreign corporate belongs. However, a taxpayer can assert double taxation 
relief, if the tax on dividend from foreign corporate is paid twice. Relief claimed can be either as per the provisions of the 
Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement, if any launched into by the Government of India with the country to which the 
foreign corporate belongs, or a taxpayer can assert relief as per Section 91 (in case, no such agreement acknowledges). 
Principally, a taxpayer does not pay tax on the identical income twice. 
8. CONCLUSION  
Despite several studies on the concept of dividend policy, issue remains debatable touching the essence of association 
between taxation and dividend policy. Indeed, introduction of taxation does not resolve hypothetical discourse on 
dividend policy as the prevailing hypothetical and empirical evidence presents conflicting results. Dividend’s taxation 
and capital gains vary intra-country and inter-country, and also, from period to period. Shareholders’ preferences being 
heterogeneous reflect clientele effect. Dividend policy is never optimal for all shareholders. Investors take into account 
the performance and distribution policies adopted by the corporate. Nevertheless, clientele effect is limited since 
shareholders taxed heavily still receive dividends indicating that there  are more determinants other than taxation that 
influence the composition of shareholders’ portfolios.  
 
9. RESEARCH COMMENT 
Taxation is an important doctrine in determining dividend policy. It cannot meet all the problems concerning dividend. 
Dividend policy is still a matter of concern and involves a large number of factors that make it more complicated. 
Researchers need to focus more on these factors like market imperfections having big impact in the development of 
dividend policy.  
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